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COMMENTS
ADJUSTING ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY FOR
NEGLIGENCE: RECOVERY FOR REASONABLY
FORESEEABLE USERS OF FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS
The privity requirement has traditionally served as a bar for
many investors who have relied to their detriment on negligently
prepared financial statements. This restriction of an account-
ant's liability has recently been broadened by some courts, which
allow specfically and even reasonablyforeseeable users offinan-
cial statements to bring negligence actions against the
accountant. This comment examines the role of the financial
statement in modern investment practice, discusses the recent
expansion of the test, and advocates the adoption of a reason-
ably foreseeable standard.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, "[t]he age-old axiom that physicians bury their mistakes,
while ... accountants file theirs away"' no longer rings true. The de-
mise of this proposition is illustrated by the expansion of the auditor's2
third party liability in negligence actions3 to include "reasonably fore-
1. Mess, Accountants and the Common Law." Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 838, 838 n.1 (1977) (citing Eizenstat & Speer, Accountants' Profes-
sional Liability: Expanding Exposure, 22 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 7 (1972)).
2. The terms "auditor" and "accountant" will be used interchangeably throughout
this comment. Auditing, however, is encompassed within the discipline of ac-
counting. More precisely, accounting is the "measuring and reporting [oil the
effects of the economic activities of individual entities." THE COMMISSION ON
AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
xiii (1978). Auditing, by contrast, "involves an independent examination to deter-
mine the propriety of accounting processes, measurements and communication."
Id This comment discusses the services performed by a certified public account-
ant (CPA). CPA candidates must meet the educational and any practical experi-
ence requirements set forth by the respective state boards of accounting. See D.
CAUSEY, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 37-40 (rev. ed. 1982)
(synopsis of the education and experience requirements of each state). Candi-
dates must then pass a national examination conducted by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). Upon successful completion of these
requirements, the state board of accountancy issues a certificate. Id
3. The term "negligence actions" is used generally. The proper common law cause
of action is for negligent misrepresentation. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 107 (4th ed. 1971); Weiner, Common Law Liability of the Certi-
fied Public Accountantfor Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233
(1983). Courts have also referred to the action as one for professional malprac-
tice. See Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436
N.E.2d 212 (1982).
This comment is limited to the common law liability of accountants to third
parties for negligence. Accountants may, however, be subjected to civil statutory
liability, see Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 13
seeable" users of financial statements. Although decisional law has
gradually increased the scope of accountants' liability to third parties
by applying a specifically foreseeable standard, until recently no deci-
sion imposed liability based on a reasonably foreseeable standard.4
This comment begins with an overview of the audit function and
its importance to the business community. Following this overview,
the comment traces the evolution of accountants' third party liability in
negligence from the antiquated concepts of privity to the two variations
on the principle of "foreseeability." The analysis then examines the
rationale underlying the various theories, focusing on the public policy
considerations posited for and against the expansion of liability. This
comment concludes that in light of the sophisticated nature of the ac-
counting profession and the business community's reliance on the func-
tion of independent accountants, the reasonably foreseeable standard,
applied in traditional tort analysis, represents a welcome expansion of
liability to a once-shielded vocation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Perspectives in Financial Reporting
The need for accurate, complete, and verified financial statements
is imperative in today's marketplace.' Users of financial statements, be
(2d Cir. 1976) (imposing liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934), and criminal prosecutions, see United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757
(9th Cir.) (former auditors of the Equity Funding Corporation of America were
convicted of securities fraud and filing false statements with the Securities Ex-
change Commission; each was sentenced to three months of incarceration, four
years of probation, and 2000 hours of charity service work), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
981 (1978); United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975) (partner of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., who was convicted for making false statements in the
1969 National Student Marketing proxy statement, was sentenced to one year in
jail with all but 60 days suspended), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 34 (1976). For a thor-
ough discussion of the forms of liability, see Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Account-
ants' Liability and Responsibility: Securities, Criminal and Common Law, 13 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 247 (1980).
4. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens State
Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983); see also
Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 382-83 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973) (establishing guidelines for the determination of liability even though pre-
cise issue confronting the court involved an actually foreseeable plaintiff); cf. Mil-
liner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) (intimating the extension
of liability to a reasonably foreseeable party).
5. "In the broadest sense the function of accounting and of the audit by an in-
dependent public accountant is to facilitate the operation of our economic sys-
tem." D. CAUSEY, supra note 2, at 1. The need to check the stewardship function
of management in the corporate setting underscores the importance of an in-
dependent audit. In addition, "accountants and auditors ... play an important
role in enabling our free market to allocate private property rights to their highest
valued uses as measured by the dollar votes of demand. Perfect competition re-
quires efficient markets supplied with complete information." Id Furthermore,
"accurate information is essential to the efficient use and exchange of property,"
which in turn "forms the basis of our economic freedom." Id (footnote omitted).
19841 Adjusting Accountants' Liability for Negligence 303
they investors (present or prospective), creditors, or regulatory agen-
cies, require economic and financial data to weigh alternatives and
evaluate decisions.6 Indeed, in most instances, financial statements are
the user's primary tool in assessing his interaction with an entity.7 The
degree of reliance placed on any set of financial statements depends,
however, upon the type of financial reporting assistance chosen by the
reporting entity.8
6. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 1 ("Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business
Enterprises"), codified in AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT-
ANTS, 3 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) AC § 1210.34 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS]. But "[financial reporting is not an end in itself...
[instead, it is] intended to provide information ... for making reasoned choices
among alternative uses of scarce resources in the conduct of business and eco-
nomic activities." Id § 1210.05.
7. The financial statements of an organization are "a principal means of communi-
cating accounting information to those outside an enterprise." 1d § 1210.06.
"[A]ithough investment and credit decisions reflect investors' and creditors' expec-
tations about future enterprise performance, those expectations are commonly
based at least partly on evaluations of past enterprise performance" as manifested
by the financial statements. Id § 1210.42. There is, however, an additional "need
to combine information provided by financial reporting with pertinent informa-
tion from other sources, for example, information about general economic condi-
tions or expectations, political events and political climate, or industry outlook."
Id § 1210.22.
8. Although many publicly held corporations are required to have audited financial
statements, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j, 77aa (1982) (required for prospectus offering); id
§§ 781(l)(b)(l)(J), 781(k) (required for annual report if corporation has assets of
$1,000,000 or more and 500 or more equity holders), the same is not true for
nonpublic entities, which are not required to register under federal securities laws.
For many years, nonpublic companies had two alternatives when engaging a
CPA's assistance for financial reporting: their financial statements could either be
audited or unaudited. Today, a more defined range of financial reporting assist-
ance is available for nonpublic companies. The three levels of service from which
these entities can choose are (1) audited financial statements, (2) financial state-
ment reviews, and (3) financial statement compilations.
Audited financial statements provide an indication of the character of the
auditor's examination, and the degree of responsibility that the auditor is assum-
ing. D. CARMICHAEL, THE AUDITOR'S REPORTING OBLIGATIONS 2 (2d ed. 1978);
see discussion infra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
A financial statement review is the performance of "inquiry and analytical
procedures that provide that accountant with a reasonable basis for expressing
limited assurance that there are no material modifications that should be made to
the statements in order for them to be in conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles." AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT-
ANTS, STATEMENTS ON STANDARDS FOR ACCOUNTING AND REVIEW SERVICES
No. 1 (1979), codified in AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT-
ANTS, 2 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) § 100.04 (1984).
A financial statement compilation is the mere assistance by the CPA in pre-
paring the financial statements "without undertaking to express any assurance on
the statements." Id For an excellent discussion concerning compilation and re-
view engagements, see Note, Accountants' Liabiliy for Compilation and Review
Engagements, 60 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1982). This comment refers to unaudited
statements because some of the cases discussed predate the advent of the review
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The financial reporting assistance that provides the greatest degree
of assurance to the user is the independent audit.9 An independent au-
dit involves a "systematic process of objectively obtaining and evaluat-
ing evidence"' 0 concerning an entity's transactions "to determine the
propriety of [management's] accounting processes, measurements and
communication."'" The objective of the audit process is to express an
opinion on the "fairness" of management's presentation 2 of the en-
tity's financial position, its results of operations, and its changes in fi-
nancial position.'3 This presentation of the entity's financial status
must be in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP),' 4 which have been applied consistently in preceding peri-
ods. 5 The expression of an opinion,' 6 which forms the basis for any
assertion of liability, requires that the auditor's examination comport
and compilation standards. This comment, however, focuses on audited financial
statements.
9. "CPAs do not guarantee audited financials, but rather represent that they have
applied usual professional standards with respect to them." D. CAUSEY, supra
note 2, at 93. Audited financial statements thus provide reasonable assurances,
based upon the type of opinion expressed. In contrast, a financial statement re-
view provides only "limited assurance," whereas a financial statement compila-
tion provides no assurance. See supra note 8.
10. See R. HERMANSON, S. LOEB, J. SAADA & R. STRAUSER, AUDITING THEORY AND
PRACTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1980) (quoting Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts, Re-
port of the Committee on Basic Accounting Concepts, 47 ACCOUNTING REVIEW
15, 18 (Supp. 1972)) [hereinafter cited as AUDITING THEORY].
11. THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORTS, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS xiii (1978).
12. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENTS ON
AUDITING STANDARDS (1972), codied in AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) § 110.02 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as AUDITING STANDARDS]. The auditor's "responsibility for the
statements he has examined is confined to an opinion on them. The financial
statements remain the representations of management." Id
13. Id § 110.01.
14. "The phrase 'generally accepted accounting principles' is a technical accounting
term which encompasses the conventions, rules, and procedures necessary to de-
fine accepted accounting practices at a particular time. It includes not only broad
guidelines of general application, but also detailed practices and procedures
. .. Id § 411.02. These principles are ever evolving and practitioners are cau-
tioned to be alert to changes in accounting principles resulting from both pro-
nouncements and common usage. See id §§ 411.05 to -.09 (clarifying the order of
authoritative sources to be relied upon).
15. Id § 150.02 (the second standard of reporting); see also id § 402.02 (stating the
objective of consistency as providing comparability).
16. Generally, one of four types of opinions is issued pursuant to an audit engage-
ment: (1) an unqualified opinion; (2) a qualified opinion; (3) an adverse opinion;
or (4) a disclaimer of opinion.
An unqualified opinion in the auditor's report states:
[T]he financial statements present fairly [the] financial position, results
of operations and changes in financial position in conformity with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (which include adequate disclo-
sure) consistently applied . . . . This conclusion may be expressed only
when the auditor has formed such an opinion on the basis of an exami-
nation made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
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with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS).' 7 The accounting
Id § 509.28.
A qualified opinion is usually issued when there is insufficient evidence to
support an unqualified opinion or the auditor has limited the scope of his exami-
nation. In addition, if based on the examination an auditor believes there has
been a material departure from GAAP, a material change between periods in the
principles of accounting or method of application, or there exists uncertainties
that might significantly affect the financial statements, he may choose to issue a
qualified opinion. Id § 509.29. "A qualified opinion states that, 'except for' or
'subject to' the effects of the matter to which the qualification relates," an unquali-
fied opinion would have been issued. Id
An adverse opinion expresses the auditor's judgment that "the financial state-
ments taken as a whole are not presented fairly in conformity with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles." Id § 509.41.
"A disclaimer of opinion states that the auditor does not express an opinion
on the financial statements." Id § 509.45. A disclaimer is proper when the scope
of the auditor's examination was insufficient for him to form an opinion. Id A
disclaimer, however, is inappropriate when the auditor believes, based on his ex-
amination, "that there are material departures from generally accepted account-
ing principles .... " Id In disclaiming an opinion, all substantive reasons for
doing so should be set forth in the auditor's report. Id
17. GAAS are formulated in three contexts: (1) general standards; (2) standards of
field work; and (3) standards of reporting. Set forth below are these formulations:
General Standards
(1) The examination is to be performed by a person or persons hav-
ing adequate technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
(2) In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in
mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
(3) Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of
the examination and preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
(1) The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are
to be properly supervised.
(2) There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing in-
ternal control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of
the resultant extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be
restricted.
(3) Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through
inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reason-
able basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under
examination.
Standards of Reporting
(1) The report shall state whether the financial statements are
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
(2) The report shall state whether such principles have been consist-
ently observed in the current period in relation to the preceding period.
(3) Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be re-
garded as reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
(4) The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regard-
ing the financial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the ef-
fect that an opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion
cannot be expressed, the reasons therefore should be stated. In all cases
where an auditor's name is associated with the financial statements, the
report should contain a clearcut indication of the character of the audi-
tor's examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking.
Id § 150.02.
Moreover, Rule 202 of the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
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profession, in its efforts to regulate the practitioner, has also set forth
audit procedures.' 8
Each type of reporting assistance necessarily involves a cost/bene-
fit analysis.' 9 Since there are inherent limitations in any reporting
assistance provided,2" absolute fairness and accuracy cannot be ex-
pected. What can and should be expected is adherence to the princi-
ples and standards set forth by the accounting profession to inform
users; these principles and standards incorporate the cost/benefit factor
in a fair balance. 2' Accordingly, courts should use these principles and
standards as guidelines in determining negligence.22
ant's Code of Professional Ethics requires that members adhere to the GAAS pro-
claimed by the AICPA. This rule recognizes Statements on Auditing Standards as
interpretations of GAAS and requires that members be prepared to justify depar-
tures from these statements. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC Ac-
COUNTANTS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Rule 202, codified in 2 AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
(CCH) § 202.01 (1984).
18. "Auditing standards differ from auditing procedures in that 'procedures' relate to
the acts to be performed, whereas 'standards' deal with measures of the quality of
the performance of those acts and the objectives to be attained by the use of the
procedures undertaken." AUDITING STANDARDS, supra note 12, § 150.01.
19. "An auditor typically works within economic limits; his opinion, to be economi-
cally useful, must be formed within a reasonable length of time and at a reason-
able cost." Id § 326.20. "As a guiding rule, there should be a rational
relationship between the cost of obtaining evidence and the usefulness of the in-
formation obtained." Id § 326.21. Moreover, in most cases "the auditor finds it
necessary to rely on evidence that is persuasive rather than convincing." Id
§ 326.19.
20. In an audit, the procedures used generally consist of tests of the accounting
records after an evaluation of the system of internal accounting control. Because
of the prohibitive costs that would be involved, there is no complete and detailed
verification of every transaction. The basic premise underlying the use of sample
testing is "that the demonstrated quality or amount of a properly selected sample
is indicative of the probable quality or amount of the whole (population) from
which the sample is selected." AUDITING THEORY, supra note 10, at 247.
Despite these precautions, audit risks do exist. A recent pronouncement,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, which pertains to audit risks and the
concept of materiality, discusses audit risk in a two part analysis. First, "the risk
(consisting of inherent risks and [internal accounting] control risks) that the bal-
ance or class contains error that could be material to the financial statements
when aggregated with error in other balances and classes." AUDITING STAN-
DARDS, supra note 12, § 312.20. Second, there exists "the risk (detection risk) that
the auditor will not detect such error." Id Because of the nature of the auditing
function there thus exists the possibility that auditors may not detect errors and
irregularities.
21. By recognizing that CPAs are not guarantors of the financial statements they au-
dit, see D. CAUSEY, supra note 2, at 93, the profession's standards incorporate
both economic and inherent limitations of the audit function.
22. But see United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805 (2d Cir. 1969) (upholding trial
judge's charge to the jury that "[p]roof of compliance with generally accepted
standards was 'evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclu-
sive .... .'), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
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B. Ultramares - The "'Primary Benefit" Hurdle
Any discussion of negligence liability of auditors to third parties,
in the absence of privity, must necessarily begin with Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, Niven & Co. 23 There, a public accounting firm was retained
by Fred Stem & Co. (Stem) to prepare and certify a balance sheet
presenting the financial position of the corporation as of December 31,
1923.24 Thirty-two serial numbered copies of the certified balance
sheet were supplied to Stem, with the recognition that they would be
exhibited as the needs of the business dictated. 25 The audit report neg-
ligently overvalued the assets, thus creating a materially misleading re-
port of the company's financial position. Plaintiff, who had lent money
to Stem in reliance upon the balance sheet, alleged negligent misrepre-
sentation and fraud on the part of the accountants in an action to re-
cover for the resulting damages.
26
The decision, written by Chief Judge Cardozo of the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, held that in the absence of acts constituting fraud,2 7
an accountant could not be held liable to third parties lacking the req-
uisite privity of contract. 28 The Ultramares court stated that the audit
23. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Although Ultramares is generally regarded as
the seminal case discussing accountants' liability to third parties, it was not the
earliest. See Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919) (accountant not
liable to a third party for misstatements in the financial statements upon which the
third party relied in purchasing the company's stock).
24. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
25. Id at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
26. Id at 176, 174 N.E. at 443. The jury awarded $187,576.32 to the plaintiff, Ul-
tramares Corporation. The trial judge, however, granted the defendant's motion
to set aside the verdict on the negligence action and dismissed the complaint. The
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department reinstated the verdict as to
the negligence claim but affirmed as to the dismissal to the fraud claim. Id; see
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 229 A.D. 581, 243 N.Y.S. 179 (1930),
rev'd, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
27. The fraud aspect of Ultramares, though somewhat overshadowed by the negli-
gence holding, is novel both in principle and in application. See discussion infra
note 60. Chief Judge Cardozo wrote that "negligence or blindness, even when not
equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an inference of fraud. At
least this is so if the negligence is gross." Ultramares, 255 N.Y at 190-91, 174 N.E.
at 449. It was on the fraud count that the court reversed and granted a new trial.
28. Id at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. Courts have not uniformly interpreted Ultramares
with respect to negligence. The first interpretation came in a 1937 Second Circuit
decision. O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir.) ("liability could be im-
posed only for fraud, a mistake in the balance sheet, even if it were the result of
negligence, could not be the basis of a recovery") (strict interpretation), cert. de-
nied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937); see also State St. Trust Co. v. Ernest, 278 N.Y. 104, 106,
15 N.E.2d 416, 418 (1938) (without the presence of a contractual relationship "ac-
countants can not be held liable for ordinary negligence in preparing a certified
balance sheet even though they are aware that the balance sheet will be used to
obtain credit"). Later interpretations, however, emphasized the distinction be-
tween the Ultramares facts and those of Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135
N.E. 275 (1922). See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I.
1968) (holding Glanzer was more analogous to the instant case); see also discus-
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was "primarily for the benefit"29 of the client company, and only by
happenstance for the use of others. Further, the court reasoned that
"[i]f liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or fraud beneath the cover of deceptive entries,
may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."3 In sum, although
the Ultramares court held that an action might lie in fraud, it was un-
willing to impose liability upon accountants for mere negligence in the
absence of privity.
C The Specically Foreseeable Standard - The Intended Beneficiary
Approach
The specifically foreseeable standard, advocated by Restatement
(Second) of Torts3 and adopted by a number of jurisdictions,32 ex-
pands accountants' third party liability beyond that imposed by the pri-
mary benefit rule espoused in Ultramares. The essence of the
specifically foreseeable standard is set forth in section 552 of the Re-
statement.33 The general rule of section 552 imposes liability for negli-
gently supplying false information to others for use in their business
affairs, if the information disseminated is justifiably relied upon by the
recipient and occasioned by a pecuniary loss.34 This liability, however,
is circumscribed by two factors.
First, the loss must be sustained by a person or persons of a limited
group "for whose benefit and guidance" the informer knew or intended
to be supplied the information.3 5 Second, the loss must be suffered as a
result of reliance upon the information supplied in a transaction that
the informer contemplated influencing or one "substantially similar" in
nature.36 Under the specifically foreseeable standard, the degree of
"care and competence' 37 expected is determined by the circumstances
sion infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the
Glanzer opinion).
29. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 466.
30. Id at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
32. 999 v. Cox & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F.
Supp. 1165 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Ingram Indus. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.
Ky. 1981); Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979); Bonhiver
v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer
Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982); Haddon View Inv. Co. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982); Shatterproof
Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
34. Id § 552(1).
35. Id § 552(2)(a).
36. Id § 552(2)(b).
37. Id § 552 comment e.
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of each case and may change according to a number of factors.38 In
addition, the burden is upon the plaintiffs to show that they fall within
the specifically foreseeable group.39
A recent decision applying section 552 in the context of auditing
and other accounting services is Haddon View Investment Co. v. Coopers
& Lybrand,4° a 1982 decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. In Had-
don View, the individual plaintiffs were general partners in Haddon
View Investment Company, through which they were limited partners
in two business enterprises. Plaintiffs, in their capacity as limited part-
ners, filed an action that included allegations of professional malprac-
tice on the part of the defendant-accountant in the performance of
accounting services for the two business enterprises. 4' In reversing a
judgment in favor of the defendant, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that the plaintiffs "constitute[d] a limited class of investors whose reli-
ance on the accountant's certified audits for purposes of investment
strategy was specifically foreseen by [the] defendant."42
The application of the specifically foreseeable standard is not re-
stricted to limited partners; courts have applied it in cases involving
creditors, 43 investors,4 and others. 45 Despite these applications, the
38. Id The Restatement notes factors such as the character of the information and
the pretense of expertise.
39. See Ingram Indus. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (describing
the Restatement's standard as imposing "a discreet and definite burden upon the
plaintiffs").
40. 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982).
41. Id at 154, 436 N.E.2d at 213.
42. Id at 157, 436 N.E.2d at 215.
43. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Shatterproof
Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); see also Seedkem,
Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979) (unaudited financial statements
and a disclaimer); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 451
A.2d 1308 (1982) (unaudited financial statements).
44. See Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973) (recovery allowed when opinion issued in contemplation that it would be
used to assess book value in a stock purchase transaction); cf. Milliner v. Elmer
Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) (no recovery allowed for future purchasers
of stock belonging to an unlimited class of equity holders).
45. See Merit Ins. Co. v. Colao, 603 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1979) (casualty insurance
company underwriting policies of the audited company); Tiffany Indus. v. Harbor
Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (insurer of audited company);
Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111,248 N.W.2d 291 (1976) (insurance agent writing
policies for audited companies).
Bonhiver, a 1976 decision by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, demonstrates
how far courts can go in distorting the specifically foreseeable standard when im-
posing liability. The accountants did not certify the financial statements; instead,
they prepared only working papers and made adjusting entries on the client's
books. The client, an insurance company, was subject to examination by the state
commissioner of insurance, who relied upon the accountants' work in maintaining
a belief that the company was solvent. Based on the commissioner's assurance of
the company's solvency, an insurance agent continued to write insurance with the
company. The insolvency of the company was ultimately disclosed because the
company's officers embezzled over $2,000,000. The Bonhiver court held the ac-
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"specifically foreseeable" standard represents only a moderate expan-
sion of liability.
D. Reasonably Foreseeable Standard - The Traditional Approach
The imposition of liability in tort law necessarily embraces the
fundamental question of the extent to which "public policy justifqies]
[the] imposition of a duty."46 In essence, the issue narrows to whether
the plaintiffs interests qualify for legal protection against the conduct
of the defendant.47 Two recent state decisions from courts of last resort
have held that a reasonably foreseeable user of financial statements,
lacking privity, may be entitled to recover in a negligence action
against accountants.48
InH Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,4 9 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
analyzed whether a third party, lacking privity, may recover in a negli-
gence action against accountants who were unaware that the third
party would rely upon the audit at the time it was performed.5" In
Adler, Touche Ross & Co. (Touche) conducted an annual audit of the
financial statements of Giant Stores Corporation (Giant) for the fiscal
year ending January 30, 1971.51 At the time, neither Giant nor Touche
had met or were aware of the existence of the plaintiffs. In November
1971, Giant commenced negotiations to purchase the plaintiffs' busi-
ness. Plaintiffs, allegedly relying on the unqualified opinion accompa-
nying Giant's financial statements, 52 received common stock in Giant
in exchange for their business. The stock later became worthless, after
the financial statements were discovered to be materially misstated.53
countants liable to the insurance agent under the rationale of section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court reasoned that the insurance agent was
injured because the commissioner relied upon misrepresentations made by the
accountants. Moreover, since the accountants were aware of the commissioner's
reliance, the insurance agent fell within the class of persons whose "agent" is the
commissioner and who should be protected by the reliance of the commissioner.
Id at 302-03.
46. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 329, 461 A.2d 138, 140 (1983). Dean
Prosser indicated that duty "is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than
an aid to analysis in itself." W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 53, at 325.
47. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 53.
48. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens State
Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
49. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
50. Id at 329-30, 461 A.2d at 140-41. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, had adopted the specifically foreseeable rule enunciated in section 552
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 183 N.J.
Super. 417, 424, 444 A.2d 66, 70 (1982), affd inpart, rev'd inpart, 93 N.J. 324, 461
A.2d 138 (1983).
51. Adler, 93 N.J. at 330, 461 A.2d at 141.
52. Id. at 329-30, 461 A.2d at 140-41.
53. The SEC entered a consent order of censure against Touche for failing to meet the
minimum standards of the accounting profession while auditing Giant's 1972 fi-
nancial statements. In re Touche Ross & Co., [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] [Ac-
counting Series Releases] FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 72,175A (1979).
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The Adler court held that reasonably foreseeable users of the fi-
nancial statements may recover if they establish the following: (1) the
receipt of the financial statements from the company under a proper
company purpose; (2) reliance upon the statements; (3) that misstate-
ments were attributable to the auditor's negligence; and (4) that the
misstatements were the proximate cause of the damages suffered.
5 4
Provided reasonably foreseeable users meet these criteria, they could
recover the actual loss incurred as opposed to the loss of any benefit of
the bargain."
In Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co. ,56 decided shortly
after Adler, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that, unless public
policy dictates otherwise, accountants may be liable to third parties,
lacking privity, for reasonably foreseeable injuries resulting from the
negligent preparation of an audit report.57 In Citizens, the plaintiff
bank allegedly had extended loans to the Clintonsville Fire Apparatus,
Inc. (CFA) based upon the accountants' opinion letter that accompa-
nied the financial statements.58 Later, a number of material errors were
discovered and, ultimately, CFA went into receivership.59 The Citizens
court reversed the trial court's grant of the accountants' motion for
summary judgment and remanded for a full factual resolution.6" In
sum, both Adler and Citizens held traditional negligence standards ap-
plicable in formulating the rule of recovery for users of financial
statements.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Ultramares - Its Time Has Passed
Although many commentators have questioned the wisdom of Ul-
tramares,61 a fairer treatment of the decision lies not in criticizing its
jurisprudence, but in focusing on the dramatic changes in the account-
ing profession and the marketplace since the opinion's issuance in
1931.62 Indeed, "[tlhe [accounting] profession . . . was in its infancy,
54. Adler, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
55. Id at 350 & n.13, 461 A.2d at 152 & n.13.
56. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
57. Id at 386, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
58. Id at 379-80, 335 N.W.2d at 362-63.
59. Id at 378-79, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
60. Id at 387-88, 335 N.W.2d at 367-68.
61. Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liabilityfor Defective Financial Reports, 15 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 436, 445 (1964); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52
HARV. L. REV. 372, 399-401 (1939); Solomon, Ultramares Revisited- A Modern
Study of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 56, 70 (1968);
Weiner, supra note 3, at 243-44. Contra Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability.-
An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675, 679 (1971).
62. [O]wnership of stock is not conferred today to a few well-informed
investors.
... [W]ith the great increase in public ownership of stock, more and
more investors, with little knowledge of the complexity of the business
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professional standards were not rigorous and a typical audit entailed
substantially less work than it would today."63 Chief Judge Cardozo's
concern for the accounting profession and his concomitant rationale as
applied in Ultramares are unpersuasive in today's business world; ac-
cordingly, the standard enunciated in the opinion should no longer de-
lineate the scope of auditor's liability to third parties in negligence
actions.
By absolving accountants of liability in negligence actions brought
by third parties, the Ultramares court evidenced a deep concern for
what, at that time, was a fledgling profession.' The lack of training,65
standards,66 and an authoritative body to provide leadership67 plagued
the accounting profession during the 1920's and early 1930's. More-
over, prior to the crash of the stock market in 1929, the federal govern-
community, are relying on the accountant's report. This new perform-
ance [was] not present when Ultramares was decided.
Mess, supra note 1, at 855; see also D. CAUSEY, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that
change in investment climate brought about a shift in objectives for financial re-
porting i.e., a move from providing information primarily for management and
bankers to supplying information for stockholders and investors).
63. Volz, Accountant's Liability to Third Persons.- Resistance in Negligence, 9 BARRIS-
TER 31, 31 (Fall 1982).
64. "The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle
doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes [ac-
countants] to these consequences." Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at
446.
65. Directly preceding the Depression approximately 36% of the native born practi-
tioners and 9% of the foreign born practitioners were college graduates. More-
over, the quality of training varied; indeed, the lack of uniform educational
standards intimated that the instructional programs in many schools were simply
inadequate. G. PREVITS & B. MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING IN AMERICA
215-16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as G. PREVITS & B. MERINO].
Today, every state has educational or experience requirements, or both, to
become a CPA. To become certified an individual must successfully pass a two-
and-a-half-day uniform examination that tests a candidate's knowledge of ac-
counting practice, accounting theory, auditing, and business law. See D. CAUSEY,
supra note 2, at 37-40.
66. G. PREVITS & B. MERINO, supra note 65, at 237-39. For example, even in the late
1930's accepted practice in the profession "did not require the auditor to observe
or test the taking of physical inventory or to confirm receivables." D. CAUSEY,
supra note 2, at 17. The opportunity to fabricate figures was clearly present. This
changed, as did many other practices in the field, after the SEC's investigation of
the McKesson & Robbins fraud. See In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 11937-1982
Transfer Binder] [Accounting Series Releases] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,020
(1940). Indeed, the McKesson & Robbins investigation has been called "a major
milestone in the development of American audit practice." See D. CAUSEY, supra
note 2, at 19.
67. Two major organizations that existed during the 1920's and 1930's, the American
Institute of Accountants (AIA) and the American Society of Certified Public Ac-
countants (ASCPA), had different perceptions of accounting practices. To add
further division, smaller organizations such as the National Association of Certi-
fied Public Accountants (NACPA) were accused of "selling" CPA certificates. G.
PREVITS & B. MERINO, supra note 65, at 205-07. One writer deemed the dichot-
omy within the profession as "The Great Schism," see 1 J. CAREY, THE RISE OF
THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 314 (1969), while another depicted the accounting
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ment maintained a laissez-faire attitude towards business affairs,
intimating little need for "corporate accountability" and resulting in no
"external control."68 The enactment of the 1933 and 1934 federal se-
curities acts,69 however, marked a new beginning for financial report-
ing in the United States.
70
Although the state of the accounting profession and conditions in
the business world may have justified the use of privity as a bar to
recovery in Ultramares, the opinion nonetheless remains enigmatic in
light of the factual situation that confronted the court and precedent
authored by Chief Judge Cardozo. The Ultramares court reasoned that
if liability for negligence absent privity existed, then the amount, time,
and class of recovery would be "indeterminate."'" To categorize the
exposure to liability as "indeterminate" is especially puzzling in Ul-
tramares since the auditors gave the client thirty-two serial numbered
copies of the certified balance sheet 72 and were also aware of the exten-
sive financing arrangements required by the business in its ordinary
course of affairs.73 Moreover, the errors committed by the accounting
firm were numerous and substantial.74
Another plausible explanation in Ultramares for barring recovery
profession from 1921 to 1931 as in a state of "chaos." G. PREVITS & B. MERINO,
supra note 65, at 208.
Today, the AICPA provides leadership in the profession. With a member-
ship of approximately 160,000, the AICPA through its boards and committees
establishes standards and procedures pertaining to the audit function. The
AICPA also provides publications, meetings, and other functions for the account-
ing profession. See R. BERGER, PRACTICAL ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 6-7
(1981).
68. See G. PREVITS & B. MERINO, supra note 65, at 198.
69. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1982)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1982)).
70. Until the securities enactments the demand for audits had decreased. G. PREVITS
& B. MERINO, supra note 65, at 204. In addition, prior to the stock market crash
there was a persistent refusal by the New York Stock Exchange to recognize the
need for independent audits of companies listed on the Exchange. Id at 205.
71. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Nevin & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444
(1931).
72. Id at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
73. Id
74. The accountants, Touche, Niven & Co., started the audit of the 1923 Balance
Sheet on January 24, 1924. The mistakes that followed read much like a comedy
of errors. First, on February 23, 1924, after the auditors performed a preliminary
check of the accounts receivable, an employee penciled a $706,843.07 fictitious
entry in the general ledger. This fictitious ledger entry was never verified to
the recording journal or to any supporting documents. Second, a suspicious
$113,119.60 item appeared in the accounts payable. Third, the client initially re-
ported an inflated inventory figure of $347,219.08. The auditors, however, uncov-
ered errors in the client's figure that amounted to $303,863.20, and adjusted the
balance sheet accordingly. Even after discovering this gross overstatement, the
auditors failed to expand the scope of the examination. Fourth, certain accounts
were simultaneously pledged two, three, and four times. Although this immedi-
ately creates doubt as to the solvency of an entity, the auditors merely accepted
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in negligence may have been because of the court's novel reasoning
that gross negligence may give rise to an inference of fraud." Indeed,
in reversing the fraud count,7 6 the Ultramares court may have been
quite confident that, on remand, recovery would be granted based on
this theory.77
Aside from the particular factual setting presented by Ultramares,
the decision appears incongruous when analyzed with prior opinions
authored by Chief Judge Cardozo. 8 In a landmark negligence case,
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. , decided three years before U-
tramares, Cardozo defined duty in terms of "the risk reasonably to be
perceived."80 Reference to the Palsgraf opinion, however, is conspicu-
ously missing from Ultramares.8 1 It is difficult to discern from the
court's opinion in Ultramares that the accountants did not reasonably
perceive reliance by others on the certified balance sheets,8 2 particu-
larly lenders, given the precise number of copies supplied and the ac-
the answer given by the client as sufficient without independent "investigation."
1d at 175-77, 174 N.E. at 443-44.
75. See discussion supra note 27 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that
the extension of auditors' liability by allowing an inference of fraud drawn from
gross negligence was perhaps unintentioned. G. PREVITS & B. MERINO, supra
note 65, at 204. These authors, however, note that Chief Judge Cardozo thought
the opinion was beneficial to the accounting profession because it clarified the
profession's position. Id
In State St. Trust Co. v. Ernest, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938), the court
extended the rationale of Ultramares with regard to the fraud count by holding
that judgment errors, if sufficiently gross, can constitute fraud. A lower court later
expanded the State St. Trust holding by allowing gross negligence to stand as a
separate cause of action. Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1954), affid, 285 A.D. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955). One federal district
court recently recognized the tort of aiding and abetting a common law fraud.
Aeronca v. Gorin, 561 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); cf Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman
& Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 452-53 (7th Cir.) (no tort law claim for aiding and
abetting a common law fraud), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1982).
76. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 190-91, 174 N.E. at 449.
77. See Seavey, supra note 61, at 403-04. The Ultramares case, however, was never
tried on remand. Instead, the case was settled out of court. See J. CAREY, supra
note 67, at 257.
78. One commentator noted that Ultramares "appear[ed] somewhat of an abberation
even when it was decided by the highest New York state court during its golden
years." Weiner, supra note 3, at 242 (footnote omitted).
79. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
80. Id at 344, 162 N.E. at 100.
81. It is ironic that the Supreme Court of New Jersey in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,
93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983), noted the Palsgraf definition of duty in holding
that an auditor may be liable to "reasonably foreseeable" users of financial state-
ments. Id at 352, 461 A.2d at 153; cf. Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co.,
122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982) (citing Pa/sgraf definition of duty but holding
section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the appropriate boundary of
liability). The Adler court also recognized that Ultramares constituted an "un-
warranted inroad" upon the principle. Adler, 93 N.J. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153
(quoting Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968)).
82. See Weiner, supra note 3, at 244 n.45.
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countants' knowledge of the client's business.83
In another opinion by Chief Judge Cardozo, MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. ,84 decided by the Court of Appeals of New York fifteen
years prior to Ultramares, the court held that an automobile manufac-
turer may be liable in negligence to third parties when physical harm
occurs to either the person or property of the third party.85 Although
the rationale of MacPherson emphasized physical harm, the court later
abandoned this distinction.86 Thus, in MacPherson, Chief Judge Car-
dozo attacked "the citadel of privity"87 to expand liability of automo-
bile manufacturers, yet in Ultramares retreated to the safe harbors of
privity to bar recovery for auditors' negligence.
In devising the primary benefit test the Ultramares court stressed
the distinction between the facts in that case and the situation in
Glanzer v. Shepard 88 In Glanzer, a public weigher, engaged by a ven-
dor of beans, negligently certified the weight of the goods, thereby
causing an overpayment by the buyers. In holding the weigher liable to
the buyers for negligent misrepresentation, Chief Judge Cardozo noted
that the use of the certificate for determining the payment due "was a
consequence which. . . was the end and aim of the transaction ' 89 and
not merely one of many possibilities. In distinguishing Glanzer, the
Ultramares decision emphasized the "end and aim" analysis9" and con-
cluded that unlike the certificate relied upon in Glanzer, the balance
sheet certification was "primarily for the [client's] benefit." 9'
Although Ultramares was decided in 1931, to a large extent its
83. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
84. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
85. Id at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
86. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (involving a weigher's
certificate and unrelated to any harm to person or property). Moreover, in Mac-
Pherson, Chief Judge Cardozo wrote:
The contractor who builds the scaffold invites the owner's workmen to
use it. The manufacturer who sells the automobile to the retail dealer
invites the dealer's customers to use it. The invitation is addressed in
one case to determinate persons and in the other to an indeterminate
class, but in each case it is equally plain, and in each its consequences
must be the same.
There is nothing anomalous in a rule which imposes upon A, who
has contracted with B, a duty to C and D and others according as he
knows or does not know that the subject-matter of the contract is in-
tended for their use.
MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 393, 111 N.E. at 1054 (emphasis supplied).
87. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445.
88. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
89. Id at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275 (emphasis supplied).
90. See Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46. In the discussion of
Glanzer, the Ultramares court stated that "[t]he bond was so close as to approach
that of privity, if not completely one with it." Id at 182, 174 N.E. at 446. This
distinction, however, has been called "highly artificial." Mess, supra note 1, at
843.
91. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
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precedential value has endured. 92 In White v. Guerante,93 the court that
decided Ultramares declined to overrule it.94 Instead, the White court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of a negligence claim by limited
partners against accountants performing auditing and tax services for
the general partnership. 95 The White court noted that "the import of
Ultramares is its holding that an accountant need not respond in negli-
gence to those in the extensive and indeterminable investing public-at-
large."96 The court explained that since the plaintiffs were a settled and
particularized group of limited partners, reliance upon the audit and
tax services provided to the partnership, at least to prepare individual
tax returns, was "one of the ends and aims of the transaction."97 Since
the claim upheld in White involved only "one of the ends and aims of
the transaction" '98 as opposed to "the end and aim of the transaction,"99
the White court essentially ignored the significance of Glanzer as distin-
guished in Ultramares. 10 Indeed, the White opinion appears to have
discarded the primary benefit test of Ultramares, either by way of an
exception,'01 or by overruling it sub silentio.
In sum, the advancement of the accounting profession as well as
the incongruities of the Ultramares opinion demonstrate the need to
reject the standard of accountants' liability enunciated by Chief Judge
Cardozo and to move towards a standard that is viable for the 1980's.
92. See Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976) (apply-
ing Florida law); Koch Indus. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974) (interpret-
ing Kansas law); Stephens Indus. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971)
(interpreting Colorado law); O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937) (ap-
plying New York law); Aeronca, Inc. v. Gorin, 561 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(applying New York law); Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Investment Corp. of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564
(1973) (involving both a disclaimer and uncertified financial statements); Dwor-
man v. Lee, 83 A.D.2d 507, 441 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1981), afld, 56 N.Y.2d 816, 438
N.E.2d 103, 452 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982); see also Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982) (Krupansky, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the abandonment of privity as an unneeded and unlimited expan-
sion of liability).
93. 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977).
94. The gravamen of the plaintiffs cause of action revolved around the accountants'
failure to notify all partners that the general partners' withdrawal of funds from
the partnership capital account was in violation of the partnership agreement.
The withdrawals amounted to about $2,000,000. Id at 359-60, 372 N.E.2d at 317-
18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
95. Id at 363, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
96. Id at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (emphasis supplied).
97. Id. at 362, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (emphasis supplied).
98. Id (emphasis supplied).
99. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 238-39, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (1922) (emphasis
supplied).
100. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
101. See Aeronca, Inc. v. Gorin, 561 F. Supp. 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); cf. Dworman
v. Lee, 83 A.D.2d 507, 507, 441 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (1981) (stating that Ultramares
was reaffirmed by the hite court), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 816, 438 N.E.2d 103, 452
N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982).
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Courts must thus recognize that the protection afforded accountants by
Chief Judge Cardozo's opinion in the 1930's is neither necessary nor
prudent.
B. Specifically Foreseeable Standard -Recoveryfor a Class of
Intended Beneficiaries
Although the specifically foreseeable standard represents an im-
provement over the primary benefit requirement of Ultramares, it
nonetheless remains limited in the imposition of liability. By extending
a right to recovery only to a limited group of third parties who are
expected to obtain the financial statement information in an antici-
pated transaction, the specifically foreseeable standard fails to promote
the improvement of financial reporting. In addition, the smaller inves-
tor, the one who needs the greatest protection, is left unprotected.
Thus, when compared to the reasonably foreseeable standard,'0 2 the
rationale of the specifically foreseeable test is unpersuasive.
The Restatement advances three reasons in support of the specifi-
cally foreseeable standard. First, a user of commercial information
cannot expect a duty to extend to him when the supplier is unaware of
the terms of the third party obligation.0 3 Second, the limitations are
imposed to promote "the important social policy of encouraging the
flow of commercial information upon which the operation of the econ-
omy rests.' Finally, since only monetary damages are suffered as
opposed to damage to person or property, the scope of liability is lim-
ited because of the extent to which the erroneous information may be
propagated and the magnitude of the losses that may ensue from
reliance. 0 5
The rationale underlying the specifically foreseeable test, however,
ignores reality. Auditors know that individuals throughout the busi-
ness world will rely upon financial statements. 0 6 Indeed, one of the
specific purposes of an independent attestation is to provide a degree of
assurance to economic and financial data that are used in weighing
business alternatives and evaluating decisions.0 7 Since this degree of
102. See discussion infra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
104. Id
105. Id
106. In H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983), the court stated
that the auditors "could reasonably expect that their client would distribute the
[audited] statements in furtherance of matters relating to business. Having in-
serted the audit in that economic stream, the defendants should be responsible for
their careless misrepresentations to parties who justifiably relied upon their expert
opinions." Id at 356, 461 A.2d at 155; see also In re Touche, Niven, Bailey &
Smart, [1937-1982] [Accounting Series Releases] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,100, at 62,220 (public accountant is responsible "not only to the client who pays
his fee, but also to investors, creditors and others who may rely on the financial
statements which he certifies").
107. See discussion supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
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assurance will not inure to the reasonably foreseeable user of the finan-
cial statements, there exists little incentive for the accounting profession
to improve the standards relating to accounting principles and the con-
duct of an audit engagement. 0 8 Given the specifically foreseeable
standard, a potential investor may be unwilling to invest because of the
inability to place any legal reliance upon the auditor's report. Further,
the free flow of commercial information will not be impeded by al-
lowing recovery to reasonably foreseeable users of the financial state-
ments. Instead, because of risk spreading, 10 9 the commercial
information being disseminated will be more reliable and will be con-
tinually upgraded to avoid any potential liability.
The specifically foreseeable test represents a moderate increase in
auditors' liability but it surely is more pragmatic in today's business
world than the standard enunciated over fifty years ago in Ultramares.
Still, because of the intrinsic limitations of the specifically foreseeable
test, the standard fails to promote the improvement of and reliance on
financial reporting. Consequently, a more expansive standard is
needed.
C Reasonably Foreseeable Standard - A Traditional Standardfor a
Modern Profession
"Why the development of the common law of accountant's liabil-
ity has proceeded so cautiously, in what is almost universally perceived
to be an activist judicial world, is inexplicable." 1° The justification for
the imposition of a duty to third parties reasonably relying on financial
statements lies not only in the change of circumstances that have occa-
108. The profession has on its own initiative and with the guidance of the SEC made
vast strides in improving the audit function. Despite these improvements, the im-
position of sanctions or liability has always prompted changes and standards to be
followed. The profession's response to In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., [1937-
1982 Transfer Binder] [Accounting Series Releases] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,020 (1940), demonstrates this point. The release emphasized the need for inde-
pendence of auditors and the need for physical inspection and verification of as-
sets. The SEC also suggested that the profession distinguish auditing standards
from auditing procedures. This provided the impetus for formulating GAAS and
issuing auditing procedures. See D. CAUSEY, supra note 2, at 18-19.
Most recently, the profession has come under increased congressional scru-
tiny. The call for federal regulation of the accounting profession has intensified
with failures such as that of the United American Bank of Knoxville, which
touched off the "largest commercial banking collapse in American history." Audit-
ing the Auditors.- Why Congress May Tighten Up, Bus. WK., Dec. 12, 1983, at 130.
Only three weeks before its collapse, the bank had received an unqualified opin-
ion as to its financial statements by Ernst & Whinney, a prominent public ac-
counting firm. Id The Government Operations Subcommittee of the House of
Representatives and the General Accounting Office are reportedly investigating
the accounting profession and its efforts in self-regulation. Id
109. See discussion infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
110. Weiner, supra note 3, at 249.
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sioned the accounting profession and the marketplace, I ' but also in
traditional tort law concerns. The policy considerations inherent in the
reasonably foreseeable analysis will surely absolve auditors' liability in
circumstances where the imposition would be improvident. The ana-
lytical framework provided by the reasonably foreseeable standard will
allow compensation through risk spreading, encourage a continued im-
provement in standards and procedures used in the profession, and ele-
vate auditors' liability to a position comparable to their status in the
marketplace.
A basic tort doctrine provides that, as between an innocent party
and a negligent party, the latter should bear the expense of damages
flowing from his negligence unless compelling public policy considera-
tions dictate otherwise. 1 2 This general rule demonstrates societal con-
cern for the compensation of innocent victims." 3 The primary
argument against increasing liability for accountants' negligence is that
the costs to the accounting profession would outweigh any benefit that
would accrue to the public. This argument rests on the premise that
increased liability would mark the demise of the profession." 4 This
argument is specious since the profession is well able to distribute the
risk of negligence through the use of liability insurance and, in the long
run, the profession will benefit.'
The use of liability insurance can effectively shift the risk of ac-
111. See discussion supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text. The accountants in Ad-
ler argued:
The holding of Ultramares has even more applicability to current
conditions than to conditions in 1933. Suffice it to say that a flood of
lawsuits have been brought against accountants by persons who invested
in failing businesses during recent recessionary periods and now seek a
deep pocket from which to recover their losses. The liability claims
made against auditors in connection with each business failure often ex-
ceed $ 100 million. Thus, exposing accountants to liability to all foresee-
able plaintiffs based upon negligent misrepresentations would have the
effect of making them insurers of the financial viability of their client's
businesses and would result in the potential for staggering amounts of
liability to the profession.
Brief and Appendix for Defendants-Respondents at 21, H. Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417, 444 A.2d 66 (1982), aff'din part, rev'd in part, 93 N.J.
324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
112. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-91 (D.R.I. 1968); F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.1 (1956 & Supp. 1968).
113. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 5.
114. See Mess, supra note 1, at 856.
115. Litigation and enforcement proceedings do more than merely assess
penalties for substandard performance or misconduct. The legal envi-
ronment affects the profession as a whole as well as the practices of indi-
vidual auditors and firms.
• . . Legal penalties and public disclosure of them have clearly spurred
the profession and firms to reexamine and strengthen technical stan-
dards and compliance with them.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORTS, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 152 (1978).
Baltimore Law Review
countants' negligence throughout the marketplace." 6 Those opposing
reliance upon liability insurance as a justification for expanding liabil-
ity point to the prohibitive costs involved. lI" In addition, treating in-
surance as an escape will eventually lead to premiums exceeding
awards that might have been received had the issues been contested in
court." These arguments, however, neglect the effect of risk distribu-
tion to the client and the incentive to improve financial reporting that
would accompany the broadening of liability.
Both Adler and Citizens recognized as a primary justification the
deterrent or financial disincentive effect that liability to reasonably
foreseeable users of financial statements would accomplish.' ' Al-
though any audit or other accounting services necessarily involves a
cost/benefit analysis,120 the increased costs for a more effective per-
formance could be passed to the client who would then distribute the
costs throughout the marketplace. The accountants' status in the mar-
ketplace is quite unique' 2' given the need for financial information. By
providing a financial deterrent, the imposition of liability based on a
reasonably foreseeable standard will encourage the improvement of fi-
nancial reporting and allow for legal reliance on the information
disseminated.
Most importantly, the reasonably foreseeable analysis will also en-
compass policy considerations that will limit auditors' liability where
an expansion would be imprudent. The requirements established by
the Adler court in allowing third parties to sustain an action against
accountants places a fair burden upon the party claiming negligence. 
22
116. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-91 (D.R.I. 1968); H. Rosen-
blum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 348 & n.ll, 461 A.2d 138, 151-52 & n.ll (1983);
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 384, 335 N.W.2d
361, 365 (1983); Mess, supra note 1, at 856.
117. The average deductible for legal insurance carried by the major firms has been
cited at over $1 million per lawsuit. See Liability Lawsuits.- The Profession Fights
Back, J. ACCOUNTANCY, May 1983, at 131; see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,
93 N.J. 324, 349-50 n.11, 461 A.2d 138, 151-52 n.l (1983) (noting defendant's
contention that insurance coverage would be "catastrophic," but stating that the
assertion was unsupported by empirical data).
118. See Woolf, Auditing and Staying Out of Court, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Feb. 1983, at 65.
119. H. Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983) (citing Weiner,
supra note 3, at 260); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d
376, 384, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1983).
120. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
121. "The legal duties of the auditor ought to be co-extensive with his professional
pretensions. He aspires to be more than a rubber stamp for management, so his
legal duties ought to go beyond that status .... ." Bradley, Liability to Third Par-
ties for Negligent Audits, 1966 J. Bus. L. 190, 196.
122. The Adler court has set reasonable limitations by requiring the party claiming
negligence to establish the following: (1) receipt of the financial information under
a proper company purpose; (2) reliance thereon; (3) that misstatements were the
result of the auditor's negligence; and (4) that the misstatements proximately
caused the damages claimed. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 350,
461 A.2d 138, 152 (1983). TheAdler court's emphasis is on reasonable reliance by
a third party. For the proposition that a nexus must exist between the injury and
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Factors such as remoteness, degree of culpability in relation to dam-
ages suffered, and likelihood that recovery would lead to fraudulent
claims must weigh in a court's determination of liability. 23 In addi-
tion, a number of defenses, 24 such as contributory negligence, may be
available for auditors to assert against the plaintiffs.
In sum, the reasonably foreseeable standard protects the innocent
user of financial statements and will help deter unprofessional work-
manship of accountants by providing financial disincentive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evolution of accountants' liability has come to the point where
the reasonably foreseeable standard is now judicious. The rationale
underlying Ultramares and its progeny is no longer persuasive in to-
day's business world. Likewise, the specifically foreseeable test does
not adequately extend liability for negligent conduct.
The accounting profession has enjoyed the unprecedented position
of playing a central role in the decisions engaged in by the business
community without the corresponding legal responsibility. This situa-
tion has led courts to reexamine this disparity. Those courts that have
held accountants liable to reasonably foreseeable users of financial
statements have recognized not only the change in circumstances and
the status of the accountant within the business world, but also the need
to protect third parties, the financial deterrent available, and the profes-
sion's ability to spread the risk through the use of liability insurance.
The imposition of liability based on a reasonably foreseeable standard
will therefore benefit both the accounting profession and the public's
interest in business.
Brian Jeffrey Frank
the negligent conduct, the court cited Toromont Indus. Holdings Ltd. v. Thorne,
Gunn, Helliwell & Christenson, 62 D.L.R.3d 225 (1976), 73 D.L.R.3d 122 (1976)
(High Court of Ontario found that plaintiffs would have proceeded with a take-
over bid despite a negligent audit. The Court of Appeals of Ontario, however,
held that the plaintiffs suffered damages to the extent that a new audit had to be
prepared). See also JEB Fasteners Ltd. v. Marks, Bloom & Co. [1981] 3 All E.R.
289 (takeover would have proceeded in any event because of the desire to acquire
the services of directors).
123. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 342, 461 A.2d 138, 147 (1983);
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 387, 335 N.W.2d
361, 366 (1983); see also Scott Group Ltd. v. McFarlane, [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553.
124. See K. ST. PIERRE, AUDITOR RISK AND LEGAL LIABILITY 16-18 (1983) (setting
forth the primary common law defenses available including attempts to prove
there existed no negligence, that the negligence did not cause the loss, that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that plaintiff's loss was recovered from
another source); see also D. CAUSEY, supra note 2, at 93-104 (discussing the above
defenses plus the tolling of the statute of limitations).
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